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REQUISITE PROOF OF BASIS FOR EXPERT OPINION
JOHN M. MAGUIRE* AND JEFFERSON E. HAHESYt
This article is about the factual foundation of expert opinion evidence.
It is tentative, not dogmatic or even confident. It proposes for further consideration by others our effort at more precise shaping of doctrines which
have become familiar but remained vague. These doctrines have to do with
the degree of stringency which is and ought to be exercised in applying
ordinary rules of evidential competency to proof of propositions of fact underlying or related to formulation and announcement of experts' opinions in
litigated cases. A concrete illustration will suggest the area of discussion:
W. H. Schooler had a proprietary interest in a 640-acre section of land
which might contain oil or gas or both. The State of Texas duly proceeded
to condemn this and other lands for a public park. On the issue of damages
the state offered Taylor Coe, a properly qualified research geologist, to
testify to his opinion that chances for oil and gas on this section were not very
good. Coe led up to this opinion by testifying (1) that he had on four occasions done geological work in the general park area; (2) that in preparation
for his testimony he had spent several hours in examining the neighborhood
of Schooler's land; (3) that he had studied most of the published and unpublished written material on the geology of the area; and (4) that he had
gathered relevant information from discussions with numerous geologists.
He said that his opinion was based in large part upon "geological reports made
by others"-namely,. the materials suggested by (3) and (4). Objection was
made to admission of his opinion because of its hearsay basis. The opinion
was admitted, damages were determined in a sum unsatisfactory to Schooler,
and Schooler appealed. Affirmed, with the statement that the objection went
to the weight rather than the admissibility of Coe's opinion testimony.'

AREAs NOT INCLUDED IN

THIS Discussion

In comment on the foregoing case abstract, we suggest at once that
a number of distinctions must be carefully observed. Our concern is solely
with the kind of evidence acceptable to establish (a) the relevant geological
features of Schooler's land; (b) the relevant geological features of adjacent
land; and (c) such additional relevant matters of fact as Coe specifically
.. *Royall Professor of Law, Harvard Law School; author, EVIDENcE: CoMM,toN SENSF
AND CoMMoN LAw (1947); co-editor, (with Edmund M. Morgan), CASES AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE; (3d ed. 1951).

fMember, Harvard Law School Class of 1951.
1. Schooler v. State, 175 S.W.2d 664, 670, 671 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943).
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relied upon in reaching his conclusion-e.g. failure of previous attempts
to exploit for oil or gas other areas having similar geological characteristics.
It is a separate problem, and not our concern, whether the lawyer questioning Coe properly framed his interrogatories to include the necessary
factual assumptions. Likewise it is a separate problem whether Coe in making
his answers went outside the limiting frame of the questions and vitiated his
opinion testimony by underpinning it with additional premises of his own.
Some cases which might have been valuable discussions of our particular
problem obscure their own meaning by confusingly dragging in the different
2
problems just mentioned.
Neither are we concerned with the proper technique of establishing
Coe's qualifications as an _xpert witness, taking it for granted that in this
process no court would assume that his professional learning, experience, and
skill were necessarily tainted because the alleged expert had absorbed large
quantities of hearsay from teachers, colleagues and others. ) Such hearsay,
going only to general capability and presumably subjected to critical analysis
by its recipient, raises no difficulty unless some particular part of it happens, in terminology already employed above, to be "specifically relied upon"
in shaping the instant expert opinion. Then, and only then, it ceases to be
a part of the expert's general background and is brought forward into the
ambit of our problem. Neither are we concerned with the problem whether
an expert must explicitly state the basis of his opinion, even though foundation facts are otherwise in evidence.4
Furthermore, within the precise limits which concern us, certain fundamental propositions must be set out at the start, as well as emphasized later on.
First, our troubles and distinctions have to do particularly and almost exclusively with the rule excluding hearsay.5 We shall, for instance, disregard
cases in which the ground of complaint is that the opinion of one expert is
based partly upon the opinion of another expert0 or has been attacked by
evidence of another's contradictory opinion. 7 Incidentally, it is obvious that
2. E.g., People v. Keough, 276 N.Y. 141, 145, 11 N.E.2d 570, 572 (1937). Here a
physician testifying for the state in a criminal case gave his opinion that the defendant
was sane, based partly on hearsay statements by defendant's mother and sister; conviction was reversed, the court talking partly about staying within proper hypothetical
questions.
3. See the reasoning in Laird v. Boston & Maine R.R., 80 N.H. 377, 117 At. 591
(1922).
4. E.g., State v. Hightower, 187 N.C. 300, 303, 121 S.E. 616, 618 (1924), and cf.
Note, 82 A.L.R. 1331, 1338 (1933).
5. It is impossible to exclude everything but the hearsay element. However, problems of opinion, best evidence, etc., will appear only incidentally.
6. E.g., Baumhoer v. McLaughlin, 205 S.W.2d 274, 278 (Mo. App. 1947); State
v. David, 222 N.C. 242, 22 S.E.2d 633 (1942) ; see Note, 98 A.L.R. 1106, 1109 (1935).
7. Cf. People v. Riccardi, 285 N.Y. 21, 32 N.E.2d 776 (1941), where the contradictory opinion was presented in hearsay form.
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when a matter of fact is sought to be proved by evidence which, although
hearsay, fits an exception to the exclusionary rule, our problem vanishes.8
So, too, when an apparent piece of hearsay can be correctly analyzed into
nonhearsay; or, still more emphatically, when judicial notice wipes out difficulties over the form of the evidence. ° We shall illustrate these points
variously at later stages of our paper. 1o
But, second, it seems equally obvious to us that the proponent of an
expert witness does not solve or avoid our problem merely through nondisclosure of a factual premise or factor influencing the expert's opinion, for
which factor there is only hearsay proof. This is too much like the concealment traditionally attributed to the ostrich. An unperceptive cross-examiner
may, of course, fail to notice what is going on; an inept cross-examiner may
not know what to do about it; but an alert and capable cross-examiner can
have the ostrich head out of the sand in a jiffy, thus forcing attention to the
problem of proof. Likewise, we do not distinguish cases according to whether
hearsay evidence of disclosed factual premises was formally offered, or
whether the premises, as to which no better proof could be had, were utilized
without offer of proof to verify them.
Confronted for the first time with a statement of the problem to which
our paper is addressed, and informed that there is substantial though inadequately explained judicial authority for relaxation of the strict rules of
evidence in this connection, any good lawyer would try to think out for himself the particular considerations likely to affect such relaxation. We venture
an analysis of this sort, including a substantial, although far from comprehensive, review of the case and statute law. 11 We find it impossible to trace
all these potential factors of decision separately in the growth of the law.
Indeed, we cannot honestly say that all have been definitely articulated. 12
But illustrative cases certainly exist where it would have been appropriate
to reason along each of the lines to be suggested. It has seemed to us most
8. As when evidence to establish the foundation facts can be fitted into a business
entry hearsay exception, for instance.
9. See infra, pp. 444-45.
10. This is necessary as some courts have confused these situations with those which
concern us.
11. Some of the cases are referred to by 2 WVIGMoRE, EVIDENCE §§ 665a, 665b (3d ed.
1940), 3 id. §§ 687, 688. A more comprehensive collection, mingled with other types
of cases, appears in DEC. DIG., Criminal Law # # 486, 487; DEC. DIG., Evidence
# # 555-57. An article of particular interest in the present connection is Dession,
The Trial of Economic and Technological Issues of Fact: II, 58 YALE L.J. 1242 (1949).
Cases on hearsay bases for expert medical opinions are collected in Note, 175 A.L.R. 267,
274 (1948). The reprinted principal case, Yellow Cab Co. v. Henderson, 183 Md. 546,
39 A.2d 546 (1944), calls for careful critical scrutiny.
12. Many of the cases which have involved our problem have not spoken of hearsay
at all. However, even these are useful for illustrative purposes and as suggesting
possible techniques.
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helpful to offer the illustrations grouped into categories, but the reader will
see that our categories cannot pretend to mutual exclusiveness.
PRELIMINARY SURVEY

1. Expert Validation of Hearsay Evidence.-The most sweeping suggestion in our field, made with substantial judicial backing, is that the special
skill of an expert witness enables him safely and properly to utilize hearsay
material in determining the facts upon which he rests his opinion. Since this
suggestion is commonly accompanied by remark or implication that such
expert validation of hearsay does not make the hearsay admissible, it follows
that at least partial substitution of experts' judgment of credibility for the
judgment of the official triers of fact is contemplated. Potentially unlimited
in scope, the suggestion normally embodies some reference to a restraining
factor of "judicial discretion" but does not describe the standards governing
exercise of this discretion.
2. Mixture of Conventional and Unconventional Evidence.-Quite frequently expert witnesses offer opinion evidence with factual bases established
partly by technically competent evidence, which is admitted, and partly by
hearsay, which is not admitted although perhaps indirectly described. To
justify admission of such expert opinion, the suggestion is that the trier shall
determine whether the hearsay fatally corrupts the whole basis, or is separable
in effect from the nonhearsay, and in the latter case how much of the opinion
is based on competent evidence. This is a formula easy to state but puzzling
to apply, the criteria being none too clearly stated and perhaps not clearly
conceived.
3. Evidence Derived from Operations of Technicians and Similar Skilled
Persons.-Fairlyoften expert witnesses have referred the demonstration of
their specific facts to technicians' reports, records of laboratory tests, X-ray
photographs, and other comparable material not put in evidence. In such a
situation., there must be a decision between (a) requiring production of, and
perhaps admitting, the technical material as a condition to admission of the
opinion testimony, and (b) allowing the opinion testimony to proceed on the
basis of material only indirectly described-a procedure affected by both
hearsay and best evidence rules. Choice between these alternatives is less
free in the case of material not readily available.
4. Professional Discipline.-When an expert proposes to base his opinion
on professional data not in evidence and perhaps not conventionally admissible,
a test factor might be fashioned by reference to the rigor and thoroughness
of professional discipline in the particular field involved. If the discipline
is severe and habitually enforced, the ruling could be for admissibility of the

436
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opinion; otherwise not. The judiciary have not yet explicitly articulated
this possibility, which has an obvious relationship to the working distinction
between exact and speculative science.
5. Especially Reliable Hearsay.-Situations can easily arise in which
expert opinion must rest on propositions of fact practically unprovable by
conventional means, but as to which there is hearsay so plainly reliable as to
carry confident conviction. Here there are several possibilities. The facts
may be treated as covered by judicial notice, which obviates the necessity of
ordinary proof; or a hearsay exception, either general or specially confined
to the particular sort of connection, may gain recognition; or experts may
be allowed to testify to their relevant opinions simply on the basis of their
own acquaintance with the reliable hearsay. Whatever the technique, results
here are fairly uniform. The courts rarely bar the expert opinion.
6. Unconventional Factual Eidence Accepted from PracticalNecessity.
-An obviously more difficult variant of the preceding situation arises when
the proof of foundation facts for expert opinion essential to intelligent trial
of an important issue cannot practically be made by technically competent
evidence, and the alternative hearsay is not outstandingly reliable. Painful
choice is demanded between admitting that the issue is nonjusticiable, and
accepting an inferior grade of proof. The courts must weigh factors of impracticability--cost, consumption of time, complication of presentation, and
so on-against risks that the inferior evidence may be essentially inadequate
for rational conclusions, dangerously misleading to the trier, or otherwise
objectionable. Perhaps again admission of the expert opinion may be justified by erecting a special hearsay exception, limited in scope to these situations; or by throwing the unconventional evidence, although not actually
admitted, open to the scrutiny of opposing counsel and their experts.
7. Proof of the Commission of Crime.-In the special case where a
prosecutor's proof of commission of crime involves expert opinion, the courts
may justifiably insist upon strict satisfaction of the ordinary rules of judicial
proof with respect to foundation facts, while perhaps not requiring such strictness of proof with regard to the defendant.
8. Secondary Issues.-Parts of the factual foundation for a piece of
expert opinion testimony are likely to be minor or secondary in the sense of
lying far from the focal centre of dispute. As to these parts, an argument
favoring easy unconventionality of proof is obviously possible.
EXPERT VALIDATION OF UNCONVENTIONAL

FOUNDATION EVIDENCE

Our first analytical suggestion is the naturally appealing one that a
capable expert can himself furnish reassuring validation of hearsay evidence

19521

BASIS FOR EXPERT OPINION

offered to establish his factual premises. This idea appears definitely and
extensively in the American decisions and enjoys the puissant backing of Mr.
Justice Holmes. Finnegan v. Fall River Gas Works Co.13 seems his initial
definitive decision on the matter, although it is not so often quoted or
paraphrased as a later and broader statement to which we refer in the next
paragraph. One of the Finnegan issues was whether a victim of a fatal
inhalation of gas, who had died alone without medical attendance, underwent
conscious suffering. On the affirmative of this issue a physician was allowed
to testify, although the witness had no experience personally, or through
patients, with this type of asphyxiation. Holmes, J., in a majority opinion,
approved the reception of the testimony. He tacitly assumed that the doctor's
views were based on medical literature, saying ".

.

. although it might not be

admissible merely to repeat what a witness had read in a book, not itself
admissible, still, when one who is competent on the general subject accepts
from his reading as probably true, a matter of detail which he has not verified,
the fact gains an authority which it would not have had, from the printed
page alone, and, subject perhaps to the exercise of some discretion, may be
admitted."' 4 The quotation shows that no problem would arise if the book
were itself admissible; consider in this connection the hearsay exception for
learned treatises, rarely recognized at common law'3 but now coming into
some vogue through legislation. 16 Observe that "fact" seems purposely
contrasted with "book," the latter remaining inadmissible despite the validation described.
The most widely circulated version of the Holmes principle was composed
several years later as a dictum in National Bank of Commerce v. New Bedford.'7 "An expert may testify to value although his knowledge of details is
chiefly derived from inadmissible sources, because he gives the sanction of
his general experience. But the fact that an expert may use hearsay as a
ground of opinion does not make the hearsay admissible." This view maintains good standing in Massachusetts, although further applications there
have done nothing much to sharpen its definition.' 8 The National Bank of
13. 159 Mass. 311, 34 N.E. 523 (1893).
14. Id. at 312, 34 N.E. at 523.
15. Except in Alabama, e.g., City of Dothan v. Hardy, 237 Ala. 603, 188 So. 264,
122 A.L.R. 637 (1939) ; Note, 65 A.L.R. 1097, 1102 (1930) ; cf. Note, 153 A.L.R. 156,
163 (1944) ; and see State v. Goettina, 61 Wyo. 420, 452, 158 P.2d 865, 877 (1945).
16. See 6 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1693 (3d ed. 1940), showing unfortunate wording and

narrow interpretation of several of these provisions. The Massachusetts statute is limited
to malpractice cases. MAss. ANN. LAws c.233, § 79c (Supp. 1950). It should be
compared with the proposal embodied in American Law Institute MODEL CODE OF
EVIDENCE, Rule 529 (1942).
17. 175 Mass. 257, 261, 56 N.E. 288, 290 (1900).
18. Johnson v. City of Lowell, 240 Mass. 546, 550, 134 N.E. 627, 629 (1922) ; Shaw
v. Keown and McEvoy, Inc., 243 Mass. 221, 223, 137 N.E. 258, 259 (1922); Commonwealth v. Orler, 252 Mass. 55, 60, 147 N.E. 548, 550 (1925) ; and Davenport v. Haskell,

293 Mass. 454, 459, 200 N.E. 409, 411 (1936).
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Commerce statement appears verbatim or by paraphrase in a number of
California cases. 19 The same general idea does service in Indiana,20 and in
decisions of other jurisdictions both before and after the National Bank of
21
Commerce decision.
The formulae quoted above are will-o-the-wispish, highly attractive
and exasperatingly indefinite. Where does the rule start and where does
it stop? The suggestion of "some discretion" is not illuminating without
even a hint as to the criteria which should guide discretionary action. One
dividing line already mentioned ought, we think, to be reasonably safe and
clear, even if blurred in the particular quotations. So long as the probative
effort is only to establish the claim of the witness to the title of expert, and
not to prove factual substrata to sustain an opinion sought from him on a
litigated matter, there will rarely be occasion for discretionary judicial disapproval because "knowledge of details is chiefly derived from inadmissible
sources." It is usually inappropriate at this stage to go into details, although
thousands of them are likely to be packed away in any real expert's training
and experience. The assumption is proper enough that, if the asserted expert
emerges from a respectable professional environment, errors in the detail of
factual information honestly assembled and imparted by capable preceptors
and associates will tend to check against one another and produce a reliable
aggregate. The story tends to run the other way when we treat details to
build up specific forensic expert opinion. They are always somewhat scru-

tinized and often microscopically examined; the law of averages cannot
commonly be counted on to produce a reliable resultant from their aggregation.
Cases involving this latter type of problem often have to be individualized.
Sometimes it is easy to see that an honest expert can certainly supply all
the requisite validation or invalidation of the hearsay foundation evidence.
A clear, though unusual, illustration is the Connecticut case of Friedler v.
Hekeler.22 Here a little girl, too immature to qualify as a witness, sued to
recover damages for personal injuries claimed to prevent her from completely
19. Betts v. Southern California Fruit Exchange, 144 Cal. 402, 409, 77 Pac. 993,
997, 998 (1904); Fishel v. F. M. Ball and Co., Inc., 83 Cal. App. 128, 134, 136, 256
Pac. 493, 495, 496 (1927); Glantz v. Freedman, 100 Cal. App. 611, 614, 280 Pac. 704,
705 (1929) ; Hammond Lumber Co. v. Los Angeles County, 104 Cal. App. 235, 247, 285
Pac. 896, 902 (1930); McElligott v. Freeland, 139 Cal. App. 143, 158, 33 P.2d 430,
437 (1934); Young v. Bates Valve Bag Corp., 52 Cal. App.2d 86, 97, 125 P.2d 840,
846 (1942).
20. Isenhour v. State, 157 Ind. 517, 528, 62 N.E. 40, 44 (1901) ; Illinois Steel Co.
v. Fuller, 216 Ind. 180, 188, 23 N.E.2d 259, 263 (1939).
21. Among the later cases are Grayson v. Lynch, 163 U.S. 468, 480, 16 Sup. Ct.
1064, 41 L. Ed. 230 (1896) ; Perkins v. United States, 228 Fed. 408, 418 (4th Cir. 1915) ;
Estes v. Denver & Rio Grande R.R., 49 Colo. 378, 388, 392, 113 Pac. 1005, 1009, 1010
(1911); Vigliotti v. Campano, 104 Conn. 464, 133 Atl. 579 (1926); Armour & Co. v.
Ross & Banfield, 110 Ga. 403, 412, 35 S.E. 787, 791 (1900) ; and Sundquist v. Madison
Rys. Co., 197 Wis. 83, 87, 221 N.W. 392, 393 (1928).
22. 96 Conn. 29, 32, 112 Atl. 651, 652 (1921).
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closing one eye. A physician testified to the extent and character of the
injuries, and while he was on the stand the child was allowed to demonstrate to
the jury how far she could close her eye. The child, not being sworn or subject to cross-examination, thus in a fundamental sense gave demonstrative
hearsay evidence of her present physical capabilities. Such evidence might
greatly mislead if spontaneously or as a result of pretrial coaching she exaggerated the effect of the injury. But on highly defensible grounds the
appellate court refused to disapprove the demonstration. The opinion says
that even if the showing "had an evidential value due to the conduct of the
child herself," which was in the nature of her testifying, it "may be regarded
as a part of the physician's testimony and under the sanction of his oath";
"if the child's conduct before the jury did not correspond with the physician's
testimony as to her physical capacity, the insincerity of her performance
could have been developed on his cross-examination." 23 This sort of intelligent expert control might be rather narrowly confined to cases where, as in
the case above, the court has a great deal of control over the expert and the
expert has thoroughgoing critical knowledge of his materials. Beyond this,
we are inclined to believe that intelligent application of other doctrines and
possibilities offered by the categories of cases presented below may give more
point and definition to the Holmes term "some discretion."
One aspect of the National Bank of Commerce and Finnegan pronouncements we incline to disapprove as importing a serious and needless
uncertainty into the law of proof. When the pronouncements permit hearsay
to lay the ground for expert opinion and in the same breath assert that this
does not make the hearsay admissible, the meaning must be that somehow
the hearsay is unfit for the trier-of-fact's consideration. Yet in the practical
workings of the doctrine the expert is allowed to convey to the trier an impression of the hearsay. There seems little force to mysterious reasoning forbidding the proponent of an expert to put in evidence textbook passages or
other hearsay matter which the expert stands ready to validate with his approval, yet permitting the expert blandly to paraphrase the passages. Several
decisions condone this result. 24 We submit that it is part and parcel of the
spurious argument by avoidance which we have already criticised.
23. Id. at 33, 112 Ati. at 653.
24. The clearest articulation seems to be in Murphy's Ex'r v. Murphy, 23 Ky.

L. Rep. 1460, 1463, 65 S.W. 165, 167 (1901), holding that testimony of physicians as to
the effect of alcoholism upon the will power, founded upon what recognized authorities
had to say on the subject, was admissible, as the witness did not attempt to state the
contents of these authorities. Other cases presenting this idea are State v. Baldwin, 36
Kan. 1, 17, 12 Pac. 318, 326 (1883) ; and Mayor, etc. of Jackson v. Boone, 93 Ga. 662,
20 S.E. 46 (1894). Cf. Emerson v. Lowell Gas Light Co., 6 Allen 146, 147, 149 (Mass.
1863), expert testimony that gas works "were known to have made their neighborhood
exempt from cholera and yellow fever.

.
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A possible reason for keeping the hearsay away from the trier is that
it has been cast in technical terminology, abbreviated form or otherwise misleading or confusing shape. That is surely pointed more at jurors than at
judges. It may be ground enough for preventing a jury from taking the
material to the jury room. It hardly seems adequate to justify complete
exclusion in the court room, where the controls of colloquial translation,
explanation and criticism can be applied.
A second reason for exclusion, probably more effective and certainly
more familiar, is the hoary belief that men at large-again we talk of jurors,
not judges-regard print or even writing with more reverence than they
accord talk, and that written or printed error may have altogether undue
influence. The respected Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has said
something of the sort fairly recently and in careful detail. 26 To us this is
very dubious. We are dealing with a highly literate population, which has
of late years seen in print such a variety of matter either true, questionable
or false as to become well trained in discrimination. Our faith in democracy
and freedom of expression rests confidently on assumption of the public's
power to avoid being fooled by deceitful writings. It is not without relevance
that Holmes' famous statement advocating "free trade in ideas" and the
testing of truth by "the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market"2 6 referred to the content of printed leaflets which
he apparently deemed loathsome. Why should we trust the citizen to discount
alluring false propaganda in the shock and turmoil of life, yet treat him as a
ninny when he reaches the comparatively ordered calm of the jury box? The
contrast is all the more cutting because what we shrink from letting him see
in court is often carefully and disinterestedly composed printed or typed
material, intended to be accurate and carrying only a minimum risk of error.
There is, of course, a halfway station between entire concealment of
hearsay used to establish an expert's facts and open admission of this material
in evidence. The vehicles of written hearsay may be produced for inspection
by opposing counsel and their experts to facilitate proper testing and crossquestioning, and perhaps to allow introduction of the material on their
initiative as contrasted with that of the proponents. Under some circumstances this course is clearly best, and we shall recur more than once to the
possibility of following it.
It is fair to sum up this part of our paper by saying that, great judge as
Holmes was, our puzzle cannot be solved by a mere parroting of his general25. Bendett v. Bendett, 315 Mass. 59, 63, 52 N.E.2d 2, 4 (1943) ; but the wise

judge who wrote the opinion did not let himself be led into any incautious language.
26. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630, 40 Sup. Ct. 17, 63 L. Ed. 1173
(1919).
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ized rule. The trier of fact, to be honestly effective, must have a chance to
analyze as much as possible of the whole situation. The courts should give
the Holmes rule working content by taking into account all the relevant
considerations discussed below. Only through that approach, we believe, can
they safely reach definite results with knowledge and honest recognition of
their reasons.
MIXTURE OF CONVENTIONAL AND UNCONVENTIONAL EVIDENCE

Very frequently an expert obtains part of his knowledge of foundation
facts by direct perception, and the rest in hearsay form. If the coverage of
direct perception is reasonably extensive, it should act as a check on the
reliability of supplementary hearsay. Thus a good situation arises for applying the liberalizing portion of the Holmes formula.
Illustrating this principle is State v. Alexander, 27 a homicide prosecution
in which it was material to establish the cause of death as being an incision
by a sharp cutting instrument. A medical examiner first examined the body
and a knife asserted to have been the lethal weapon; he then secured and
studied photographs of the internal portions of the wounds, these photographs
having been made at the time of the autopsy; he also sent to a laboratory for
examination by a skilled technician the dress worn by the deceased at the
time of the killing, the technician's tests indicating that the cut had been
made by a sharp instrument. The medical examiner testified that these
supplementary inquiries confirmed his original opinion that the wound was
made by a sharp cutting instrument. The defendant objected to the medical
examiner's testimony as resting upon hearsay evidence, and later moved
that the testimony be completely stricken from the record. The objection
and the motion were both denied. Being convicted, defendant appealed.
The upper court held there was no error since the medical examiner's conclusion was based primarily on his own observations, thus invalidating the
claim of improper hearsay foundation. Furthermore, the motion to strike
out all the medical examiner's testimony, and not alone those parts referable
to the supplementary hearsay information, fails because the prosecution was
clearly entitled to use those parts of the testimony based wholly on the
personal perceptions of the witness.
As intimated by the preceding sentence, this same result can be even
more emphatically reached if the expert can and does testify that what he
has perceived firsthand gives the sustaining platform for his conclusion, the
matters resting on hearsay proof serving only as a reassuring guard rail.
27. 7 N.J. 585, 596, 83 A.2d 441, 446 (1951).

And see Schwinegruber v. St. Louis

Public Service Co., 241 S.W.2d 782, 787 (Mo. App. 1951).
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The case becomes more questionable if the expert has not directly perceived
any of the foundation facts and the proof as to part alone of these facts is by
normally admissible evidence from other observers and as to the rest by hearsay. Where there is such a mixture of conventional and unconventional
proof the court often says that the hearsay element goes to the weight and
not to the admissibility of evidence.28 This expresses a result without reasons
and seems a dodging refusal to face up to the problem.

EVIDENCE DERIVED FROM

OPERATIONS OF TECHNICIANS AND

SIMILAR SKILLED PERSONS

Where the expert's knowledge of foundation facts comes from reports or
the like by laboratory or other technicians, a strong case can be made for
admissibility of his testimony. Instances include X-rays, 20 Wasserman
tests,30 analyses of pus and other substances,31 and reports of hospital technicians. 32 Our citations, it must be confessed, show rejection of expert
opinion rested on this type of hearsay, except for certain cases from Ohio,
Texas and Wisconsin. 3 However, in these citations there is double, occasionally triple, difficulty. Some of them suggest, in addition to the hearsay
problem, failure adequately to connect with the particular patient the technical material which the expert witness considered. Also, in most instances
only the description of this basic material was tendered. Perhaps in this
situation the judge's discretion would be properly exercised if it took the form

of accepting the proffered opinion evidence solely on condition that the X-ray
28. E.g. State v. Sturtevant, 96 N.H. 99, 70 A.2d 909, 913 (1950).
29. Equitable Life Assurance Society v. Kazee, 257 Ky. 803, 806, 79 S.W.2d 208, 210
(1934) ; Gastiger v. Horowitz, 220 App. Div. 284, 221 N.Y. Supp. 481 (2d Dep't 1927) ;
Schackelford v. Commercial Motor Freight Inc., 44 Ohio L. Abs. 526, 528, 65 N.E.2d
879, 880 (1945); Southwestern Cotton Oil Co. v. State Industrial Commission, 167
Okla. 294, 295, 29 P.2d 122 (1934); Traders & General Ins. Co. v. Milliken, 110 S.W.2d
108, 115 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937); Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Wells, 207 S.W.2d
693, 695 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947); and Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Fletcher, 214
S.W.2d 873, 876 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948) ; cf. Schwinegruber v. St. Louis Public Service
Co., 241 S.W.2d 782, 787 (Mo. App. 1951). The foregoing Texas Civil Appeals cases
may be different from other cases cited in this note; they either are ambiguous as to
who took the X-ray pictures or indicate that the testifying expert did so.
30. Sovereign Camp W.O.W. v. McDaniel, 251 Ky. 212, 217, 64 S.W.2d 581, 583
(1933) ; Equitable Life Assurance Society v. Kazee, 257 Ky. 803, 806, 79 S.W.2d 208,
210 (1934).
31. United States Health & Accident Ins. Co. v. Jolly, 118 S.W. 281, 282 (Ky.
1909); General Accident Life & Fire Assur. Corp., Ltd. v. Richardson, 157 Ky. 503,
508, 163 S.W. 482, 485 (1914).
32. Hayes v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 235 Mo. App. 1261, 1273, 150 S.W.2d
1113, 1118 (1941); Sundquist v. Madison Rys. Co., 197 Wis. 83, 87, 221 N.W. 392,
393 (1928).
33. Schackelford v. Commercial Motor Freight Co., 44 Ohio L. Abs. 526, 65 N.E.2d
879 (1945); Traders & General Ins. Co. v. Milliken, 110 S.W.2d 108 (Tex. Civ. App.
1937); Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Wells, 207 S.W.2d 693 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947);
Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Fletcher, 214 S.W.2d 873 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948)
Sundquist v. Madison Rys. Co., 197 Wis. 83, 221 N.W. 392 (1928).
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plates, reports, and So on were put in evidence or opened to inspection. This
gets rid of any suggestion of violating the best evidence rule, and should be
done in all cases where there is access to the reports or 'similar materials.
In this connection also, it is worth noting that common law and statutory
liberalization of the hearsay exception for business entries is increasingly
likely to render hospital records and technicians' reports generally admissible,
34
thus disposing of the evidentiary difficulty we are discussing.
PROFESSIONAL DISCIPLINE

It is highly arguable that in determining how accommodating to be in
the probative matters we are discussing, the judge should always consider the
degree of professional discipline in the field of the testifying expert. 35 Those
skilled in the exact areas of physical science such as chemistry, physics or
engineering 'can well be allowed more leeway in basing their testimony on
hearsay sources than those testifying as experts in speculative matters such
as sanity or insanity, or land valuation.
It would seem that where an engineer is partly basing his opinion on,
for instance, a table of the strength of materials, there is diminished danger
that his testimony will be unreliable. Further, such tables are commonly
available. The opponent will be neither surprised nor handicapped in valid
criticism. On the other hand, a judge would be justified in insisting that a
doctor testifying as to insanity base his conclusions on a nonhearsay showing,
whether by his own testimony of personal observations or like testimony from
others, as the learning in this field 'has not yet reached and may never reach
a high degree of exactness. While we have not been able to find any opinionclearly stating this criterion, it has been suggested in cases which permit the
36
expert to speak "from the accepted facts of medical [or other] science."
ESPEcIALLY RELIABLE HEARSAY
An expert may base his testimony on material which is undeniably
hearsay but so trustworthy as to call for unhesitating acceptance. We encounter this situation frequently, but usually in connection with .other considerations favoring acceptance of the evidence. Hence our immediate ex34. See 5 WIGMORE, EViDE.CE §§ 1520, 1530a (3d ed. 1940).
35. "An expert representing a recognized and trusted discipline or science may base
conclusions on his general background of study and observation, including the reported
data of fellow scientists and technologists, despite its hearsay character. But if the
scope of the expert's qualification-or the status of the special discipline which he
represents-falls short, then he is likely to be confined to the interpretation of specified
data already in evidence.". Dession supra, note 11, at 1263.
36. Marshall v. Brown, 50 Mich. 148, 150, 15 N.W. 55, 56 (1883); Woelfle 'v.
Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co., 103 F.2d 417, 418 (8th Cir. 1939).
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amples should be taken as impliedly suggesting the significance of this factor
37
in cases placed elsewhere.
In Pennsylvania Threshermen & Farmers' M'Iutual Cas'ualty Itsurance
Co. v. Messenger,38 the terms of a liability insurance policy required the
insured to prove that Yamassee, South Carolina, where an accident had
occurred, was no more than 500 miles distant from Salisbury, Maryland.
He produced a witness expert in making measurements on the earth's surface,
and this witness testified that with the aid of United States Geodetic Survey
maps to fix precise latitude and longitude he had computed the distance to
be exactly 490.37 miles. Reception of this testimony was held proper, tle
opinion saying it was permissible to combine the special knowledge of the
witness and the experiments and reasonings of others "communicated by
personal association or through books or other sources."8 0 This sweeping
statement confirms the Holmes principle, but it is surely advisable to note the
extreme reliability of the maps employed. Indeed, these maps would seem
fully entitled to the benefit of the official written statements exception to the
hearsay rule. If so, the reliability factor carries this case out of our frame
of controversy.
As everybody knows, there are in common use many tabular compilations,
some based upon pure mathematical computations, others involving combinations of experimental observations with mathematics. Of these a number are
so universally accepted that judicial notice is taken of their reliability. The
simplest and most common illustration is the calendar.40 Hand in hand with
the calendar is the almanac. 41 When judicial notice is taken, the judge
removes the case from our purview. Of course, no ordinary judge can
remember the details of a calendar, still less of an almanac or table of logarithms, but this is unlikely to restrict the scope of the principle. Never, or
almost never, is the free operation of judicial notice hampered by suggestion
37. E.g., the Schooler case, 175 S.W.2d 664 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943), described near
the beginning of this paper.
38. 181 Md. 295, 29 A.2d 653 (1943).
39. Id. at 299, 29 A.2d at 655. No copies of the geodetic survey maps were produced
in court. While counsel for the insurance company could easily have obtained copies for
themselves or consulted them in a library or repository of government documents, it
would seem better practice for the proponent of the expert testimony to have had copies
immediately at hand. They would have been admissible without restricting limitation
so far as the hearsay rule is concerned if we are correct in believing that they qualify as
official written statements.
40. Beardsley v. Irving, 81 Conn. 489, 71 Atl. 580 (1909); Wilson v. Van Leer,
127 Pa. 371, 378, 17 Atl. 1097, 1098 (1889) ; cf. Line v. Line, 119 Md. 403, 407, 86 Atl.
1032, 1034 (1913). Cases are collected in Note, 8 A.L.R. 59, 63 (1920).
41. Indeed, almanacs are one means of perpetuating calendar information as to
coincidence of days of the week and month. Further, of course, they tell of such matters
as the time of sunset, judicially noticed in Missouri Pacific R.R. v. Magness, 206 Ark.
1081, 1082, 178 S.W.2d 493, 494 (1944) ; State v. Morris, 47 Conn. 179, 180 (1879) ; and
State v. Simler, 350 Mo. 646, 650, 167 S.W.2d 376, 379 (1943).
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of a serious hearsay element in the printed vehicle of information which the
judge consults, despite the possibility of error in preparation of copy, typesetting, proof reading and press work. In a double sense, such instances may
get beyond the bounds of our discussion. They completely by-pass ordinary
rules of exclusion; and often they obviate the use of an expert witness, because
with the tables an ordinary layman can compute the results relevant to the
litigation.

42

Other reliable tabulations, however, do not enjoy the advantage of
judicial notice of their verity, and require at least enough expert testimony
to establish their solid professional standing. Sometimes, too, application
of such tables to the problem at hand calls for expert judgment, and here
our problem is full fledged.4 3 It seems to us appropriate to go far with a
general hearsay exception for materials of this type. Even where an exception
is not recognized we suggest that it would be straightforward and wise to
admit the tabulations as exhibits for scrutiny under limiting instructions
when a qualified expert builds their contents into his testimony. An especially
common aspect of the matter is encountered when an expert testifying to
valuation bases his testimony on regularly published lists of sale or market
44
prices.
In this connection it is worth noting that certain professional literature
can sometimes be put to important nonhearsay use. Suppose that during a
medical malpractice case it becomes material to prove the local standard of
due care in treating, say, a fracture of the radius. A qualified medical witness
testifies that Smith on Fractures is accepted throughout the local branch of
the medical profession as describing one or more proper ways to handle such
42. It lies within judicial discretion to decide if the jury can intelligently compute
from the tables.
43. Piper v. Boston & Maine R.R., 75 N.H. 228, 233, 72 At. 1024, 1028 (1909)
(statistics of medical cases collected at the Vanderbilt Clinic) ; Auer v. Sinclair Refining Co., 103 N.J.L. 372, 375, 137 Atl. 555, 557 (1927) (mortality tables) ; Hanley v.
Boston & Maine R.R., 286 Mass. 390 399, 190 N.E. 501, 505 (1934) (mortality tables) ;
Carbone v. Boston & Maine R.R., 89 N.H. 12, 20, 192 At]. 858, 863 (1937) (statistics
as to the effect of certain air brakes in stopping trains) ; Los Angeles & Salt Lake
R.R. v. Umbaugh, 61 Nev. 214, 222, 123 P.2d 224, 228 (1942) (tables showing experimental values of brakes) ; State v. Lingman, 97 Utah 180, 191, 91 P.2d 457, 462 (1939)
("coefficient of friction" taken from table in mechanical engineer's handbook, court
suggesting that the table might better have been introduced in evidence, implying that
it would have been admitted) ; People v. Lang Transportation Corp., 43 Cal. App.2d 134,
142, 110 P.2d 464, 468 (1941) (tables of strength of materials) ; Morgan v. PittsburghDes Moines Steel Co., 86 F. Supp. 255, 276 (W.D. Pa. 1949), rev'd, 1'83 F.2d 467, 470
(3d Cir. 1950) (lower court seems to say that reports of tests on the strength of a
certain kind of steel are admissible under a business records hearsay exception; the
point disappears in the appellate discussion). The foregoing cases are arranged by topics
rather than chronologically. Some of these tabulations may have a claim on judicial
notice.
44. Some States recognize a hearsay exception for commercial lists and published
market reports, e.g., Weber v. Umback, 125 Kan. 117, 118, 263 Pac. 786 (1928);
ef. cases collected in Note, 43 A.L.R. 1184, 1192 (1926), and in 6 WIGa1oaR, EVIDENCE
§ 1704 (3d ed. 1940).
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an injury. If the defendant puts Smith's book in evidence to show that his
treatment followed one of the procedures recommended by the author, or the
plaintiff puts in the book to show that the defendant broke away from everything recommended, there is no hearsay problem whatever.Y
Other like possibilities come to mind. If a certain descriptive register
of cargo vessels is used up and down the Atlantic coast as reliably furnishing
part of the information for computing the worth of ships described therein,
the register may, without ruffling the remotest edge of the hearsay rule, be
admitted in a New York trial where one issue is the market value of such a
ship.46 The reason, of course, is that the very words of this register, quite
aside from their truth, influence market values.
UNCONVENTIONAL FACTUAL EVIDENCE ACCEPTED FROM
PRACTICAL NECEsSITY

The trial judge in United States v. Alumimnm Co. of America47 delivered
one of the most careful and explicit opinions relating to our problem. Here
a cardinal issue was the degree to which the defendant had succeeded in
carrying monopolistic control of workable bauxite deposits. These deposits
were remote and scattered; intelligent estimation of their contents depended
upon numerous samplings by drill holes. The judge approved admission of
expert testimony based upon drill hole reports made by others than the
testifying witnesses. The judge states his general principle, using language
which might be called a cautionized variant of the Holmes wording: "Opinion
testimony by an acceptable expert resting wholly or partly on information,
oral or documentary, recited by him as gathered from others, which is
trustworthy and which is practically unobtainable by other means, is competent
even though the firsthand sources from which the information came be not
produced in court. . . . In other words, when hearsay evidence is offered
it is admissible if resort to it be essential in order to discover the truth and
if the surroundings persuade the court that the information adduced by the
expert as a basis of his opinion is reliable." 48 This seems a proposal for a
specialized hearsay exception essential to expert opinion, and not for a general
45. The cases are not so clean-cut as they might be on this matter. See Bowman
v. Woods, 1 G. Greene 441, 444 (Iowa 1848), as explained in Bixby v. Omaha &
C.B. Ry.& Bridge Co., 105 Iowa 293, 299, 75 N.-. 182, 184 (1898) ; Ruud v. Hendrickson, 176 Minn. 138, 222 N.W. 904 (1929); and Baldwin v. Gaines, 92 Vt. 61, 64,
102 Atl. 338, 340 (1917).
46. Slocovich v. Orient Mutual Ins. Co., 108 N.Y. 56, 62, 14 N.E. 802, 804 (1888)
(suggests the line of thought but cannot justly be taken as definite authority); cf.
Kent v. Darman, 137 Atl. 467, 468 (R.I. 1927) (admitting a published statement by
the American Institute of Architects as to fair minimum charges-"one of the elements
to be considered" in deciding on an architect's proper charge).
47. 35 F. Supp. 820 (S.D.N.Y. 1940). See Dession, supra, note 11, at 1244.

48. Id. at 823 (italics added).
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hearsay exception out of as well as in the expert witness context. While
paying his respects to the standard element of reliability, the judge plainly
deems the primary moving force to be practical necessity- without this kind
of exception, such a case could not be rationally tried; expense and dislocation
of human activities would be too great, and too much courtroom time would
have to be spent.
We need not enter the field of massive antimonopoly litigation 9 to find
examples wherein this factor of impracticability is paramount. When an
expert testifies as to the results of his examination of voluminous records,
books or accounts,50 his testimony must be admitted if the case is to be tried
in an intelligent manner, even though the original writings be not admissible
under a hearsay exception. In. this class of cases, however, we do believe
that a sagaciously applied business entries hearsay exception will solve many
of the difficulties. Whatever the procedure by which the testimony be employed, the materials on which the expert bases. his testimony should at least,
if possible, be produced in court -or otherwise made available for scrutiny
by opposing counsel.
A similar situation arises when a taxpayer claims that his property has
been disproportionately assessed, although not necessarily overvalued. He
is likely to have to present a large number of comparisons respecting the
ratio between assessed value and fair market value. Something can sometimes
be done either by statute5' or by common law ingenuity 52 to simplify 'the
process of comparison, but there has long been a well recognized practice of
going to the appropriate registries of deeds, tabulating the recited or indicated
sales prices of comparable properties, and setting these prices against assessed
valuations for the same properties.5 3 This is redolent with hearsay, if selling
prices are inferred from deed recitals or from revenue stamps;-and the hearsay
odor becomes stronger if the tabulator rounds off his work in the records
by visiting the brokers or principals and asking them how much they paid
or were paid. This hearsay may not be too reliable, but it is from necessity
allowed as a basis for expert opinion bearing on the litigating taxpayer's
49. Cf. Dession, supra, note 11.
50. Cf. Ritter v. State, 70 Ark. 472, 478, 69 S.W. 262, 264 (1902) (books of a
bank) ; People y. Moone, 334 Ill.
590, 606, 166 N.E. 480, 487 (1929) (voluminous
accounts, papers and documents).
51. See White v. State Board of Tax Appeals, 123 NJ.L. 350, 8 A.2d 819 (1939),
for discussion and application of a statute which is quite radical, N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2:101-1 (1939). People ex rel. Hagy v. Lewis, 280 N.Y. 184, 20-N.E.2d 386 (1939),
meets a difficulty in application of a different kind of statute making. comparison less
onerous.
52. Dallas County v. Dallas National Bank, 142 Tex. 439, 179 S.W.2d 288 (1944),
is a good modern illustration.
53. Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County, 260 U.S. 441, 443, 43 Sup. Ct. 190,
67 L. Ed. 340, 28 A.L.R. 979 (1923), is a.famous illustrative case. Without citing adverse
judicial criticism of the method of proof, we add the caution that it has been challenged.
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claim that he has been assessed at a percentage of market value unfavorably
disparate to that applied to the mass of holders of similar property. The
ordinary life of a community cannot be paralyzed to furnish firsthand evidence
every time a disproportionate assessment case is seriously litigated.
An important consideration in this area is that of expense. In the
Schooler case the land was found to have not only a speculative but a very low
value, the gross award aggregating just $1440.5 4 This put the state at a
great advantage as it could afford to pay a good deal for geological evidence
usable in a succession of damage cases, while the cost to most separate individual landowners would be prohibitive. Combination of landowners is not
always practicable. Often, too, isolated disputes will arise wherein this type
of showing is important and neither party will find it financially practicable
to continue the fight if he has to muster a regiment of acceptable witnesses,
expert or nonexpert, whether their testimony is zvva. voce or by deposition.
In such situations the judge will do well to consider a relaxation of his rules
of admission.
Per contra, a judge will naturally incline, and surely should be supported
in his inclination, to require strict proof of foundation facts of expert opinion
when producing this proof is easy and inexpensive. Thus in State v.
Frotten55 the appellate court held it was error to admit testimony for the
state on defendant's insanity from an expert who acknowledged that his
opinion was based in part upon information given him by his assistants, the
assistants not being produced as witnesses. It would seem little more difficult
or costly to call the expert's assistants than to call the expert himself. 0
Re-examining the Finnegan case in this light we suggest that if the trial
occurred under circumstances making it easy for the plaintiff to produce an
expert with previous personal experience in illuminating gas asphyxiation
cases, the trial judge might properly, perhaps should, have exercised his
discretion to require utilization of such an expert. If the circumstances made
this difficult, it was appropriate for the trial judge to "make do" with the
rather unsatisfactory expert actually produced.57 This situation has arisen
many times in criminal cases where the defendant was tried for such crimes
54. Mr. Schooler's own idea of value was more optimistic, but we must not fail
in due respect to the judicial determination, 175 S.W.2d 664, 667.
55. 114 Vt. 410, 417, 46 A.2d 921, 926 (1946).
56. Cf. People v. Samuels, 302 N.Y. 163, 170, 172, 96 N.E.2d 757, 761, 762 (1951),
where firsthand testimony from an informant could seemingly have been had. Another
ground for criticism existed here. The exact contents of hospital records was not
disclosed to the jury, thus hampering appraisal of expert opinions; ". . . if it was improper
that the jury should see them, they should not have been received in evidence as a basis
for the experts' opinions"-a comment to which the authors heartily subscribe.
57. The case originated in Fall River and was trkied in Bristol County, so that the
excellent medical facilities of Boston and Suffolk County were not immediately at hand.
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as a poison murder,5 8 poisoning a well 59 or murder by strangulation. Probably most physicians have little chance to observe the effects of poison on
the bodily system in normal course of practice; so unless the court feels that
such an expert can with reasonable facility be produced, the physician who
has his learning on the subject from hearsay sources may rightly be allowed
to testify.

PROOF OF THE COMMISSION OF CRIME

Another consideration worth mentioning is that the demand for strictness
of proof may tend to vary according to particular legal consequences. When
a defendant is on trial for an offense involving his life or freedom a court
has reason to demand strict proof of foundation facts on the part of the state.
Several instances have arisen where this result was reached in major prosecutions ;"l but whether the fact that they were criminal trials influenced the
decision we are unable confidently to determine. While failing to point in the
case law to explicit acceptance of this factor, we deem it material to put
forward.
If the state is held to strict proof of foundation facts, the question
should be faced the other way about. Here we think that other factors
mentioned come into account and the defendant should be treated no more
rigorously than an ordin'ary civil litigant.
SECONDARY

ISSUES

The facts underlying expert opinion are not all concentrated in the
immediate area of controversy. Some, which it will be convenient to call
peripheral, are more or less remote. For instance, an expert forming a conclusion as to the prognosis of a personal injury claimant finds his focal facts
in the physical and mental condition of the particular patient. But for com58. Siebert v. People, 143 Ill. 571, 579, 32 N.E. 431, 432 (1892) (testimony-admis(testimony admissible); State v.
sible) ; Carter v. State, 2 Ind. 617, 619 (1851)
Baldwin, 36 Kan. 1, 17, 36 Pac. 318, 326 (1686) (testimony admissible) ; People v.
Thacker, 108 Mich. 652, 659, 66 N.W. 562, 565 (1896) (testimony admissible); State
v. Terrell, 12 Rich. L. R. 321, 327 (S.C. 1859) (testimony admissible) ; Soquet v. State,
72 Wis. 659, 662, 40 N.W. 391, 392 (1888) (testimony not admissible).
59. Boswell v. State, 114 Ga. 40, 42, 39 S.E. 897, 898 (1901) (testimony admissible).
60. Boyle v. State, 57 Wis. 472, 478, 15 N.W. 827, 829 (1883) (testimony not
admissible).
61. State v. Gevrez, 61 Ariz. 296, 302, 148 P.2d 829, 831 (1944) ; Ingles v. People,
90 Colo. 51, 58, 6 P.2d 455, 458 (1931) ; State v. Morgan, 3 N.J. Misc. 135, 136, 127
Atl. 337, 338 (Sup. Ct. 1925) ; State v. Frotten, 114 Vt. 410, 417, 46 A.2d 921, 926
(1946); Soquet v. State, 72 Wis. 659, 40 N.W. 391 (1888); and Boyle v. State, 57
The Finnegan opinion, 159 Mass. 311, 34 N.E. 523
Wis. 472, 15 N.W. 827 (1883).
(1893), supra note 13, cites Soquet v. State without comment, perhaps to indicate that
judicial discretion as suggested by Holmes may be neglected to the point of abuse
which will cause reversal.
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parative purposes he will also have to pay attention, at least in cases which
are out of the common run, to the experience of other victims of injuries fairly
comparable with those of the claimant. The histories of these peripheral
comparatives may have great effect in shaping the immediate forecast, but it
would seem unwise to demand utterly strict proof of facts which the expert
uses only for comparative purposes. While no judicial opinion known to us
makes this distinction in so many words, various decisions sustaining liberality
in establishment of peripheral facts are consistent with its recognition.0 2

CONCLUSIONS

We neither formulate nor advocate any hard and fast rules as a solution
of our problem, and offer no easy way out. Except when cases can be analyzed
as presenting nonhearsay situations, the trial judge must use the "sound
discretion" mentioned by Holmes in deciding when to create limited hearsay
exceptions, when to exclude expert testimony based on hearsay, and when to
admit expert testimony based on hearsay the judge does not deem it wise
to admit.
It is surely wrong, though, to prolong and deepen the mystery of specific
application by refusing frank recognition of the desirability and possibility
of systematic rationale. Aversion to the unrevealing formula of "going to
weight rather than to admissibility" has already been expressed. A paragraph
of clear judicial explanation for exclusion or admission can help the profession more than a carload of catchphrases. We have tried to suggest several
lines which such explanation may follow. 63
62. Woelfle v. Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co. of Hartford, 103 F.2d 417, 418
(8th Cir. 1939); Piper v. Boston & Maine R.R., 75 N.H. 228, 233, 72 Atl. 1024, 1028
(1909) ; Carbone v. Boston & Maine R.R., 89 N.H. 12, 20, 192 Atl. 858, 863 (1937);
and State v. Sturtevant, 96 N.H. 99, 70 A.2d 909, 912 (1950).
63. Since submission of the manuscript for this paper, two interesting and perhaps
significant decisions bearing upon the topic have been rendered. The first is In re Mundy,
85 A.2d 371 (N.H. 1952), discussing and applying the New Hampshire act for control
of sexual psychopaths. The case involved proper use of information gathered for, and the
report made by, an examining board of experts, one of the members of which board
testified. The majority opinion argues strongly for liberality in the use of hearsay evidence,
certainly in this kind of case, which is deemed distinguishable not only from criminal
prosecution but also from adversary civil proceedings, and perhaps in litigation generally.
The second new case is Delaware, L. & W. R.R. v. City of Hoboken, 85 A.2d 200, 203,
206 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1951), an appeal from tax assessment of railroad property. The
opinion argues that an expert on value may properly use as part of the basis for his
opinion such sources as business men usually employ in determining market values, thus
touching upon considerations involved in notes 45 and 46, supra. The opinion also deals
emphatically with the factor of practical convenience, as to which see notes 47 et seq.,
supra.

